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Abstract: 
Credit is very important in the lives of the poor people. The benefits of credit are 
manifold. Even after more than six and a half decade since independence, the extent and 
important of informal credit have not diminished to a great degree in India. This paper aims 
at to understand the significance of personalized relations in the working of the informal 
credit market with the help of the All Indian Debt and Investment survey data.  .Our 
analysis shows that there is distinct compartmentalization of the Indian credit market with 
respect to the disbursement of loan from various credit agencies. Each of these category of 
credit agencies has some definite target group to cater to. Apart from this clear division of 
loaning pattern, the importance of trust, personalized knowledge and mutual co-operation 
in the informal credit market has also been observed. 
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1. Introduction 
Poor people cannot live without credit (Dasgupta, 2004). The benefits of credit are 
omnipotent. Provision of financial services to the ‘unbanked’ could spur economic growth 
and open up plenty of opportunities. The chance to avail the power of financial services can 
indeed assist people to pay for schools of the children, save for a home, or begin a small 
business. Moreover this can open up jobs for others (World Bank, 2011). 
However, most of them are outside the ambit of formal credit structure. They do not 
have the relevant parameters that can qualify them as debtors in the formal market. 
According to a World Bank 2011 survey covering  150,000 people in 148 countries, three 
fourth of the world’s poor do not have a bank account and are not part of the formal credit 
market. Besides, other factors such as the travel distance, associated costs and extent of 
paper work involved in opening up a bank account, come in the way of their registration in 
the formal credit market.  
In India, the picture is no different. The data revealed by the AIDIS implores that 
even after almost six and a half decades since independence, the informal credit still 
contributes about 44% of the total credit in the rural areas and 15.5% in the urban areas. The 
informal sector in India has taken multitude of forms. AIDIS data broadly categorizes them 
under five heads. Among them, the moneylenders is the dominant category, followed by 
relatives and friends etc. Traders and commission agents, landlords and the miscellaneous 
others fill up the remaining portion of the informal credit. 
The working of the informal sector is slightly different from that of the formal 
sector. In the formal sector, the transactions are legalized and often collateral bondings are 
essential. For the informal sector, they may not always be so important. People depend on 
personal or local knowledge, local information and other impersonal mechanism for 
disbursement of loans in this sector (Dasgupta, 2004). The prominence of this sector is a 
testimony of the vestiges of informality and trust in the informal credit market in India. 
There have been many attempts to address the issue of informality (Bhaduri, 1973; 
Gangopadhyay and Sengupta, 1986) in the Indian credit market. However, a rigorous 
empirical study linking the informal transactions to the personalized and local information 
is still missing. This may be due to either the non-availability of data on these items or an 
insufficient quantification available. 
This paper is a modest attempt to understand the ramifications of personalized 
relations in the working of the informal credit market. For this, we utilize the available data 
as procured by the AIDIS ever since 1951. A gleaning of this data finely helps us to gain 
some indirect pathways into the personal habitats where rural informal credit market 
thrives.    
The paper makes an attempt to find out the correlates of various sources of non-
institutional credit. Some variables other than the constituents of credit have also been 
introduced to capture the causal factors in a better way. The rest of the paper is divided as 
follows. Section 2 general features of the credit data. Section 3 deals with the data, 
description of the variables and the methodology part and section 4 deals with results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. General Features of Indian Credit Market 
In India, a large part of the credit comes from the informal avenues. We are considering 
the rural data only for the illustration in the growth of credit and its components in the graph 
1. The role of informal credit has not diminished even after years of expansion of formal 
banking. From table 1, it is evident that between 1951 to 1961, the share of institutional 
credit in total credit more than doubled. This type of surge continued till 1981. However, 
the rate of growth of institutional credit slowed down considerably over the decade 1981 to 
1991. Subsequently, the share of institutional credit in total credit declined. Among the 
various institutional sources, commercial banks and co-operative societies dominated. On 
the other hand, if we glance through the share of non-institutional credit in total credit, we 
find that this share has declined appreciably between 1951-1981. In the next decade, this 
rate of decline dropped. Interesting, 1991 onwards, the trend got reversed and the share of 
non-institutional credit in total credit started to increase. In effect, we see an almost inverted 
U-shaped curve for institutional credit and a U-shaped curve for non-institutional credit 
during the period 1951-2013 (see graph 1). The turning point is the decade of 1990s, when 
this changeover has occurred. This coincides with the era of liberalization.  
Graph1: Trends in the Credit (Rural) 
  
 Table 1: Break-up of Rural Credit (%) 
Sources of 
Credit  
1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2002 2013 
Institutional 7.2 14.8 29.2 61.2 64 57.1 56 
Institutional* 4.1 5.7 9.1 32.6 45.4 29.8 31.2 
Non-
Institutional 
92.8 85.2 70.8 38.8 36 42.9 44 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
*Various institutional sources except co-operatives 
However, if we further break up the institutional sector, we find the dominance of the 
commercial banks and the co-operatives (graph 2). It is to be noted that co-operatives is 
based more on trust than on formal structure. If we remove the contribution of the co-
operative societies from the institutional capping, the importance of the institutional sources 
dwindles further.  
Among the various non-institutional sources of rural credit, we find from graph 3 that 
moneylenders dominated throughout the entire time span. However, the dominance of the 
moneylenders in the overall rural credit disbursement has steeply been crashed during the 
period 1951-1981. This decline has slowed down in the next decade. The share of 
moneylenders in total credit reached a nadir in the pre-liberalization period. However, in 
the next two decades since the onset of liberalization, the stranglehold of the 
moneylenders again started to increase in the rural sphere.  
Graph2: Various Sources of Institutional Credit 
 
 Graph3: Various Sources of Non-Institutional Credit 
 
If we further take up the data on break up of loans outstanding according to the asset 
holding class, we find some important features both in case of rural and urban areas. In the 
rural areas, we find that 22% of the total loans taken by the lowest decile class in the rural 
areas are within the range of Rs 35,000 to Rs. 60,000, whereas only 4.3% of the total loans 
of the highest decile class in the rural areas are within this range. More than half of the 
loans of the highest decile class are of over Rs four lakhs, whereas only 4.2% of the loans 
of the lowest decile class is above Rs 4 lakhs. It is quite obvious that non-institutional 
sources are less likely to grant this high amount of loans which are usually taken by people 
with higher asset holding, comes mostly from the institutional sources. 
On the other hand, smaller loans (say anything less than Rs. 20,000) are mostly 
taken by the people with less asset holdings. Disbursement of such tiny loans, which are 
sometimes taken for the purposes such as daughter’s marriage, sickness etc., are less likely 
to be disbursed from the structured institutional sources. Here the personalized, door-step 
and of course trust-based informal networks come into play. 
The same trend is also visible in case of urban sector. In this sector, 16.1% of the 
loans taken by the lowest decile class is of less than Rs. 35,000., whereas only 0.1% of the 
loans taken by the highest decile class is of less than Rs. 35,000. 
Now, if we take into consideration the data according to the purpose of loan, we find 
out some important features. Both in the rural and urban areas, loans taken by the 
households with low asset holdings are for consumption purposes–with least potential for 
capital formation. Various expenditures in households, medical treatments, repayment of 
old debts etc form the major purpose for taking out loans by the households with lower 
asset holdings. On the other hand, expenditures in farm business, expenditure in non-farm 
business and expenditures on housing are the main purposes for taking out loans by the 
households with higher asset holdings. 
In essence, we see a strong asymmetry in the credit market of India. The credit 
market seems to be broken into three components among the debtors–(a) well-offs 
(economically strong and included in the institutional set up), (b) let-offs (economically 
stable but not included in the institutional set up fully) and (c) have nots (economically 
weak and financially excluded). Generally, the well-offs take most of their credit from the 
formal sector. The let-offs on the other hand, are not familiar with the formal sector. Also, 
may be the rigidities of the formal sector prove a great hindrance for them. Hence, though 
they can approach the formal sector, they still depend on informal sector. They are 
probably reaping the benefits of informal sector. Worse is the situation of the have nots. 
They do not have enough collateral to approach the institutional sector. Hence they are 
bounded to the limits of informality. They also have to depend on building upon many 
types of informal ties for getting loans from the informal sector for sustenance 
(Chakraborty, 2010). 
From these casual findings, we should now move on to more rigorous 
characterization of the relationships.  
3. Data, Description of Variables and Methodology 
The empirical analysis is based on the data of All India Debt and Investment Survey 
conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) during 2013 (70th round). 
The Debt and Investment Survey, generally carried out once in a decade, provides 
information on different aspects of the rural and urban finances. The state wise data on 
cash loans outstanding by different credit agencies is available in the report on Household 
Indebtedness in India (NSSO 70th round). The different variables from the whole list credit 
components that we have used in our study include–all institutional agencies (IL), landlord 
(LL) which includes both the agricultural as well as the professional moneylenders, 
relatives and friends (RF), doctors, lawyers & other professionals (DLO) and various other 
miscellaneous credit sources (O). 
Some other explanatory variables that we have used in the study include various 
socio-economic factors. One such variable is average value of assets (AVA)1. Higher 
AVA implies that a household is more likely to possess the collateral required for taking 
out institutional loan. Again, in order to gauge an idea about the familiarity with banking 
services, we take into consideration the number of households (in 1000 households) with 
bank accounts (BAN) as an explanatory variable. It is anticipated that there should be a 
negative relationship between demand for credit from any non-institutional source and 
BAN. Another important variable that we have considered in the study is the literacy rate 
(LIT). State wise literacy rates for the rural and urban areas have been taken from the 
Census 2011 data. It is commonly anticipated that a highly literate household should rely 
more on various institutional credit agencies for taking out a loan. We have also used 
dummy to capture the difference between the rural and urban households. 
For estimation purpose, we have used seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
technique in our exercise. The dependent variables represent the demand for credit for 
various non-institutional sources as well as the demand for loan from the institutional 
sources as a whole. The estimation methodology for this system of equations is a SUR 
model. Zellner’s SUR or SUR model is undertaken in the estimation of a system of 
equations when the error terms across the equations can be assumed to be correlated.  
                                                             
1 Assets like land, buildings, livestock, agricultural implements & machinery, non-farm business equipment, 
transport equipment were considered under physical assets, while cash and kind dues receivable and shares, 
deposits, etc., were considered under financial assets. Average value of all these assets owned per households 
is named as AVA. 
The system of equations for credit for various non-institutional sources as well as the 
demand for loan from the institutional sources as a whole can be viewed as a system of 
demand equations for various sources of credit. Also interesting to note is that the 
equations have same explanatory variables and that might increase the likelihood of 
having correlations in the error terms. In such a situation, the estimation of equations by 
classical OLS renders the estimates of betas and gammas inefficient. Therefore, to recover 
efficiency, this system of equations is estimated with a FGLS (Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares) and this is known as the Zellner’s SUR estimates.  
We have a set of six equations correlating demand for loan with various socio-economic 
variables We now discuss them as follows: 
LL=  +  ML +  RF+  DLO+  0+  BAN +  LIT +  AVA+  Dummy +   
ML=  +  LL +  RF+  DLO+  0+  BAN +  LIT +  AVA+  Dummy +     
RF=  +  LL +  ML +  DLO+  0+  BAN +  LIT +  AVA+  Dummy +     
DLO=  +  LL +  ML +  RF+  0+  BAN +  LIT +  AVA+  Dummy +     
0=  +  LL +  ML +  RF+  DLO+  BAN +  LIT +  AVA+  Dummy +     
IL=  +  LL +  ML +  RF+  DLO+   0 +  LIT +  AVA+  Dummy +    
4 Results 
The system of equation used by us correlates the demand for various sources of credit with 
the alternative sources available and a set of socio-economic variables. While placing the 
demand for credit from any one source, one individual has to decide on the amount of 
credit from various other options that are available before him. These are the first set of 
explanatory variables used in the exercise.  
Also, the individual decision to take loan from any source depends on his/her abilities to 
adjudge between the sources. In this, he/she requires to perform the cost-benefit analysis. 
This, in turn, depends on the features of the world he/she inherits. Literacy rate, 
availability of banking facilities and average value of assets are some of the factors in this 
consideration.  
First, we consider the demand for loans from the landlord. This is significantly positively 
related with the demand for loans from the doctors, lawyers & other professionals. It is 
negatively related with demand for loans from various other miscellaneous sources 
meaning that these sources often act as a cushion to those who cannot appeal to the 
landlord for loans. The negative relationship with banking facilities and the demand for 
loan from the landlord, implies that the expansion of banking facilities often help to curb 
the stranglehold of the landlords. Unfortunately, literacy has no role in reducing the 
influence of the landlord.  
Secondly, we consider the demand for loans from the moneylenders. Here again, we find 
that ML is significantly positively correlated with the demand for loans from the doctors, 
lawyers & other professionals. Availability of banking facilities have no influence on the 
operation of the moneylenders in the credit market. However, literacy rate has significant 
negative relationship demand for loans from the moneylenders. This implies that higher 
literacy rate gives a blow to the operation and networks of the moneylenders, which 
sometimes thrives on the tenets of informality.  
Thirdly, if we consider the demand for loans from the relatives and friends, which 
essentially build on the traits of mutual trusts and consents among two parties, we find that 
the availability of formal banking facilities and the literacy rate have no influence on it. The 
negative relation with demand for loans from the relatives and friends and the demand for 
loans from various other miscellaneous sources implies that there are some group of 
individuals who are not even covered by the informal networks of friends and relatives. For 
this group of people, various miscellaneous sources come out as the last resort.  
Fourthly, for the demand for loan from the doctors, lawyers and other professionals, we 
again find positive relationship with demand for loans from the moneylenders. Again, 
availability of institutional banking services, literacy rate and average value of assets have 
no significant impact demand for loan from the doctors, lawyers and other professionals, 
which again hinges on the attributes of mutual co-operation and personal knowledge. The 
demand for loan from the doctors, lawyers and other professionals is positively correlated 
with the demand for loans from various other miscellaneous sources.  
Fifthly, we consider the various correlates of the demand for loans from various other 
miscellaneous sources. We find significant positive association with this and the demand for 
loans from the doctors, lawyers and the other professionals. However, we find negative 
relationship with the demand for loans from the landlord and the demand for loans from the 
relatives and friends. This implies that households’ credit demand which are not covered by 
the various other miscellaneous sources, are filled in by the landlords and the relatives and 
the friends. Again, literacy rate and the availability of banking facilities have no bearing on 
the demand for loan for various miscellaneous other sources. Interestingly, average value of 
assets have negative correlation with the demand for loans from various other miscellaneous 
sources. This implies availability of some credit for the poorest of the people for their 
sustenance.  
Sixthly, quite obviously we see that demand for loan from institutional sources is 
significantly negatively associated with different non-institutional sources of loan. Again, 
the positive association between the demand for loan from institutional sources and the 
literacy rate is also understandable. However, assets have no impact on the loan provided by 
the institutional sources.   
Caressing through the regression analysis, we find some interesting anecdotes. The 
correlation between various types of loans and the parameters that effective show certain 
interesting features. First, we see that there is a close complementarity among the demand 
for loans from the moneylenders, landlords and the doctors, lawyers & other professionals. 
The relationship among them is positive and in many case significant. A person who can 
obtain a loan from any one of these sources, can also generate loan from other sources in the 
set. These sources are generally connected with collateral mortgaging though they are 
informal in character. The informality in them lies mainly through their non-rigidity and 
flexibility of terms and conditions. They however, are not going to lend to the have-nots. 
The source of loan from the relatives and friends and various other miscellaneous sources 
are of different nature. The demand for loan from miscellaneous other sources is negatively 
related with the demand for loan from the landlord but positively related with that from the 
doctors, lawyers and other professionals. It is also negatively related with the demand for 
loan from the moneylenders though not significantly. The relationship is also substitutable 
as they bear a negative relationship.  
Interesting, however, is the relationship they bear with the average value of assets. The loan 
from friends and relatives is not at all related with that of average value of assets. However, 
strangely, the loan from various other miscellaneous sources is negatively related with 
average value of assets. This definitely implies that these sources are no way dependent on 
the amount of collateral. The loan disbursed from this sector may be dependent on some 
personal ties and or trusts and reciprocity. The importance of trust is greatly pushed forward 
when we consider this source. 
In effect, we find the situation similar to that we have conjectured. Clearly this points out to 
a three tier credit market– (a) the institutional one lending to well-offs and included, (b) the 
upper informal, lending to the well-offs but not included and (c) the lower informal lending 
to the have-nots.   
5. Conclusion 
 
Gleaning through the AIDIS data both casually as well as rigorously, we find some 
interesting features on the working of the credit market in India. Our analysis provides some 
idea about the distinct compartmentalization of the Indian credit market with respect to the 
disbursement of loan from various credit agencies. Each of these category of credit agencies 
has some definite target group to cater to. 
 
Apart from this distinct division of loaning pattern, the importance of trust, personalized 
knowledge and mutual co-operation in the informal credit market has also been visualized. 
Otherwise, it is economically untenable for any credit agency to disburse loan to the have-
nots.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Break up of Loans Outstanding – Asset Class Wise (%) Rural 
 
 
 
Table 3: Break up of Loans Outstanding – Asset Class Wise (%) Urban 
 
  
Results 
 
Seemingly unrelated regression 
   
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Equation Obs Parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
LL 70 8 8.60269 0.3187 89.6 0 
 
ML 70 8 122.3251 0.3818 53.74 0 
 
RF 70 8 67.14607 0.1795 26.74 0.0008 
 
DLO 70 8 3.634286 0.2551 80.18 0 
 
O 70 8 17.88712 0.1623 27.72 0.0005 
         
 
| Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   LL | 
        
 
ML | 0.012185 0.007844 1.55 0.12 -0.00319 0.02756 
 
 
RF | -0.01307 0.014713 -0.89 0.374 -0.04191 0.015763 
 
 
DLO | 1.695108 0.230246 7.36 0 1.243834 2.146382 
 
 
O | -0.10871 0.055006 -1.98 0.048 -0.21652 -0.0009 
 
 
BAN | -12.6681 6.631873 -1.91 0.056 -25.6663 0.330152 
 
 
LIT | 0.065279 0.17239 0.38 0.705 -0.2726 0.403156 
 
 
DUM | -1.58513 2.876657 -0.55 0.582 -7.22327 4.053017 
 
 
AVA | 0.951689 1.631639 0.58 0.56 -2.24627 4.149642 
 
 
CONS | 67.36494 35.91503 1.88 0.061 -3.02724 137.7571 
 -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   ML | 
        
 
LL | 2.69095 1.732316 1.55 0.12 -0.70433 6.086228 
 
 
RF | -0.33229 0.217385 -1.53 0.126 -0.75835 0.093781 
 
 
DLO | 7.999687 4.087643 1.96 0.05 -0.01195 16.01132 
 
 
O | -0.50742 0.826486 -0.61 0.539 -2.12731 1.112462 
 
 
BAN | -72.8067 101.1536 -0.72 0.472 -271.064 125.4507 
 
 
LIT | -6.04383 2.451817 -2.47 0.014 -10.8493 -1.23836 
 
 
DUM | -39.4678 42.65309 -0.93 0.355 -123.066 44.13068 
 
 
AVA | -1.11047 24.36219 -0.05 0.964 -48.8595 46.63854 
 
 
CONS | 1160.456 532.0864 2.18 0.029 117.5855 2203.326 
 -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   RF | 
        
 
LL | -0.85759 0.965088 -0.89 0.374 -2.74913 1.033946 
 
 
ML | -0.0987 0.064567 -1.53 0.126 -0.22524 0.027855 
 
 
DLO | 1.638669 2.291796 0.72 0.475 -2.85317 6.130507 
 
 
O | -1.25548 0.438331 -2.86 0.004 -2.11459 -0.39636 
 
 
BAN | -31.9105 55.34149 -0.58 0.564 -140.378 76.55685 
 
 
LIT | -1.98 1.385634 -1.43 0.153 -4.69579 0.735793 
 
 
DUM | -60.0784 22.40926 -2.68 0.007 -104 -16.1571 
 
 
AVA | 11.47031 13.13072 0.87 0.382 -14.2654 37.20604 
 
 
CONS | 346.3789 300.2748 1.15 0.249 -242.149 934.9067 
 -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   DLO | 
        
 
LL | 0.30191 0.041008 7.36 0 0.221535 0.382285 
 
 
ML | 0.006452 0.003297 1.96 0.05 
-9.63E-
06 0.012913 
 
 
RF | 0.00445 0.006223 0.72 0.475 -0.00775 0.016646 
 
 
O | 0.043471 0.023265 1.87 0.062 -0.00213 0.089069 
 
 
BAN | 4.529416 2.85998 1.58 0.113 -1.07604 10.13487 
 
 
LIT | -0.01888 0.072358 -0.26 0.794 -0.1607 0.122943 
 
 
DUM | 1.023149 1.211739 0.84 0.398 -1.35182 3.398113 
 
 
AVA | -0.21129 0.691054 -0.31 0.76 -1.56573 1.143147 
 
 
CONS | -27.4255 15.57037 -1.76 0.078 -57.9429 3.091827 
 -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   O | 
        
 
LL | -0.50077 0.253377 -1.98 0.048 -0.99738 -0.00416 
 
 
ML | -0.01058 0.017239 -0.61 0.539 -0.04437 0.023204 
 
 
RF | -0.08817 0.030782 -2.86 0.004 -0.1485 -0.02783 
 
 
DLO | 1.124274 0.601693 1.87 0.062 -0.05502 2.30357 
 
 
BAN | 3.756005 14.64564 0.26 0.798 -24.9489 32.46092 
 
 
LIT | -0.16872 0.370854 -0.45 0.649 -0.89558 0.558142 
 
 
DUM | -13.2923 6.033539 -2.2 0.028 -25.1178 -1.46675 
 
 
AVA | -5.69143 3.416239 -1.67 0.096 -12.3871 1.004278 
 
 
CONS | 97.39897 79.49369 1.23 0.22 -58.4058 253.2037 
 -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   IL | 
        
 
LL | -0.96803 0.017632 -54.9 0 -1.00259 -0.93347 
 
 
ML | -1.00193 0.001187 -844.47 0 -1.00426 -0.9996 
 
 
RF | -1.00151 0.002177 -460.04 0 -1.00578 -0.99724 
 
 
DLO | -1.0005 0.041778 -23.95 0 -1.08238 -0.91861 
 
 
O | -0.98963 0.008215 -120.46 0 -1.00573 -0.97353 
 
 
LIT | 0.048663 0.025511 1.91 0.056 -0.00134 0.098664 
 
 
DUM | -0.05849 0.424781 -0.14 0.89 -0.89104 0.774067 
 
 
AVA | 0.293068 0.241892 1.21 0.226 -0.18103 0.767168 
 
 
CONS | 983.4413 5.493305 179.03 0 972.6746 994.2079 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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